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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee, :
V.

:

Case No. 940157-CA

WAYNE M. GAUGER,

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for theft of an operable
motor vehicle, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann.

§ 76-6-404

(1990) .

This Court has jurisdiction over the

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (Supp. 1994).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

After conducting the balancing test required by rule 609

of the Utah Rules of Evidence and State v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325
(Utah 1986), did the trial court act reasonably in admitting
defendant's prior conviction for burglary?
If,

after

performing

a

balancing

test,

a

trial

court

determines that evidence is admissible, the appellate court reviews
that decision for correctness.

"But in deciding whether the trial

court erred as a matter of law, we de facto grant it some
discretion, because we reverse only if we conclude that it acted
unreasonably in striking the balance.
1

If we conclude that the

trial court erred, we may characterize that ruling as "an abuse of
discretion," but in reality we have found that the court committed
legal error and that the unfairly prejudicial potential of the
evidence outweighs its probativeness." State v. Ramirez, 817 P. 2d
774, 781-82 n. 3 (Utah 1991) (citations omitted).

See also State

v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 n.ll (Utah 1993).
2. Where a prosecution witness volunteered that defendant was
on parole, did the trial court act reasonably in denying a mistrial
and immediately admonishing the jury to disregard the reference
and, later, giving a curative jury instruction?
An appellate court "will uphold the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion for a new trial unless [it] determine [s] the
court has abused its discretion."

State v. Boone, 820 P.2d 930,

932 (Utah App. 1991) (citing State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 918-19,
923 (Utah 1987).
3.

Was the evidence adduced at trial sufficient to support

the jury's verdict of guilty?
A criminal conviction will only be reversed for insufficient
evidence when the evidence is "so inconclusive or so inherently
improbable

that

'reasonable

minds

must

have

entertained

reasonable doubt' that the defendant committed the crime."

a

State

v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Petree,
659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), superseded on other grounds. State
v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Rule

609(a)

of

the

Utah
2

Rules

of

Evidence,

governing

impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime, provides:
(a) General rule.
For the purpose of
attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than the
accused has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime
was punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year under the law under which
the witness was convicted, and the evidence
that an accused has been convicted of such a
crime
shall
be
admitted
if
the
court
determines
that
the probative value of
admitting
this
evidence
outweighs
its
prejudicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it
involved
dishonesty
or
false
statement,
regardless of the punishment.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1990) , governing the determination
of habitual criminals, states:
Any
person
who
has
been
convicted,
sentenced, and committed for felony offenses
at least one of which offenses having been at
least a felony of the second degree or a crime
which, if committed within this state would
have been a capital felony, felony of the
first degree or felony of the second degree,
and was committed to any prison may, upon
conviction of at least a felony of the second
degree committed in this state, other than
murder in the first or second degree, be
determined as a habitual criminal and be
imprisoned in the state prison for from five
years to life.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1002

(1990), governing procedure and

punishment of habitual criminals, provides in pertinent part:
(2) If the defendant is bound over to the
district court for trial, the county attorney
shall in the information or complaint set
forth the felony committed within the state of
Utah and the two or more previous felony
convictions relied upon for the charge of
being a habitual criminal.
If a jury is
impaneled, it shall not be told of the
previous felony convictions or charge of being

3

a habitual criminal. The trial on the felony
committed within the state of Utah shall
proceed as in other cases.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged in a second amended information with one
count of theft of an operable motor vehicle, a second degree
felony. The information also stated that, upon conviction for the
theft, defendant should be determined a habitual criminal, pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1990) (R. 13-14) .
tried by

a jury

and

convicted

as charged

Defendant was

(R. 86) .

After

stipulating to the existence of three previous felony convictions,
defendant was then found to meet the statutory criteria for a
habitual criminal (R. 89-90, 163) . Accordingly, pursuant to the
statutory enhancement provision of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001, the
court ordered him to serve a five year to life term in the Utah
State Prison (R. 90) . Defendant then filed this timely appeal (R.
92-93) .
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the evening of November 22, 1993, Shontee Torres's mother
noticed that her daughter's Camaro was not parked out in front of
their home (R. 64) . Shortly thereafter, Shontee returned home and
confirmed that the car was missing (R. 70) .

They reported the

loss, including $19 in cash and some personal items, to the Moab
police (R. 66) .
The car was spotted the next evening at Moab's City Market.
When the police responded to that location, the vehicle was gone
(R. 102). Shortly thereafter, the vehicle was sighted in front of
4

a trailer in a mobile home park in Grand County, south of Moab (R.
78, 87, 102). Four police officers responded to the location (R.
79) . One officer approached the home, knocked on the door, and was
admitted by two young women.

When the officer asked for the

individual who had been driving the car, one of the women responded
that she didn't know what he was talking about (R. 80). Although
the woman denied that anyone else was in the trailer, the officer
heard "a commotion in the back of this trailer house, footsteps,
things being pushed around. I could tell, obviously, that a person
. . . was back in the back of the home and they were rustling
around" (R. 81) .

The woman then gave the officer permission to

look in the back of the trailer (R. 81).
While the first officer had been approaching the front of the
dwelling, a second officer had moved to the back of the trailer (R.
88).

Standing beneath and to the right of a window, he heard it

open and then close again. He testified, "I figured that somebody
had either seen me or heard me down below. . . .1 advised [a third
officer] to just stand here in case anybody comes out of the
window, and then I approached the front door, to meet with [the
first officer] f! (R. 89).
The two officers went to the back of the trailer (R. 89) . In
the rear bedroom, they saw a foot sticking out from underneath a
bed.

They asked the individual to come out (R. 81, 90). When no

response followed, one of the officers lifted up the bed, revealing
defendant underneath (R. 82) . Defendant was taken into custody.
The Camaro car keys and a driver's license in the name of Charles
5

Cox were subsequently found in his pocket (R. 91-92) .
At the Sheriff's Office, defendant was mirandized.

He then

stated that he "had gotten loaded, saw the car with the keys in the
ignition, and took it to help a friend move back to Moab from Grand
Junction (R. 93-94, 108) . Defendant consistently represented, at
the time he was first discovered in the trailer, at the Sheriff's
Office, and again at trial, that he intended to return the vehicle:
I mean, I wasn't going to just drive it up to
her house or anything, pull out and everybody
see me right there, and I figured, well, I'd
try to get it as close to her house as I
could, where a lot of people go so she'd get
the car back.
(R. 111.

See also R. 85, 95, 107). Defendant asserted that he

intended to leave the vehicle at the Moab City Park, but that the
police had intercepted him before he was able to do so. Defendant
also testified that he had planned to withdraw $19 from his bank
account the next day and return it to Shontee Torres by placing it
in her mailbox (R. 112).
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged, of
theft of an operable motor vehicle (R. 86).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Prior to admitting one of defendant's prior convictions, the
trial court balanced the probativeness of the burglary conviction,
as it went to defendant's credibility, against its potential
prejudicial effect, as required by Utah rule of evidence 609(a) (1)
and State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986).

While reasonable

minds may differ on admissibility, the trial court did not act
unreasonably in striking a balance that favored probativeness.
6

Furthermore, the substance of defendant's own testimony reflected
so poorly on his credibility that it rendered the brief reference
to the prior conviction de minimis by comparison.
Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying
defendant's

motion

for a mistrial, following

an

reference by a witness to defendant's parole

inadvertant

status.

Once

defendant's prior conviction had been admitted, the fact that
defendant was on parole from prison added nothing of significance
to the total picture before the jury at the time it rendered its
decision.

Furthermore, defendant has failed to show how he was

prejudiced by the remark. And, the trial court obviated any error
by immediately admonishing the jury to disregard the statement and
by giving a curative jury instruction at the close of trial.
Finally, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's
verdict.

Defendant fails to appreciate that a jury may not only

consider the evidence before it, but also the reasonable inferences
that may be drawn from that evidence.

When both are considered,

the jury's verdict is amply supported.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR, AFTER CONDUCTING
A PROPER BANNER ANALYSIS, IN ADMITTING
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTION.
AND, IN ANY
EVENT, THE PRIOR CONVICTION DID NOT HAVE A
PREJUDICIAL EFFECT ON THE OUTCOME, GIVEN THE
UNBELIEVEABILITY OF DEFENDANT'S SUBSTANTIVE
TESTIMONY
The law is well-settled that "convictions for crimes not
involving

dishonesty

or

false

statement
7

cannot

be used

for

impeachment purposes in Utah unless they are felony convictions and
the trial court has applied the proper balancing test under the
rule [609(a)(1)]."1

State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 653 (Utah 1989)

(citations omitted). The balancing test includes consideration of
at least five factors:
[1] the nature of the crime, as bearing on the
character for veracity of the witness.
[2] the recentness or remoteness of the prior
conviction. . . .
[3] the similarity of the prior crime to the
charged crime, insofar as a close resemblance may
lead the jury to punish the accused as a bad
person.
[4] the importance of credibility issues in
determining the truth in a prosecution tried
without decisive nontestimonial evidence. . . .
[5] the importance of the accused's testimony, as
perhaps warranting the exclusion of convictions
probative of the accused's character for veracity.
State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1334 (Utah 1986).2
In this case, defendant was asked on cross-examination if he
had ever been convicted of a felony.

When he stated that he had,

the prosecution asked, "What felony and when?" (R. 116). Before
defendant answered, his counsel asked for a brief recess and then
1

"Stealing-type crimes," including theft and burglary, are
not necessarily crimes of "dishonesty or false statement," which
are admitted automatically under rule 609(a)(2).
They may be
admitted pursuant to that section, however, if the court determines
that "they were committed by fraudulent or deceitful means bearing
directly on the accused's likelihood to testify truthfully." State
v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 656 (Utah 1989). Accord State v. Wight,
765 P.2d 12, 18 (Utah App. 1988).
In this case, no such
determination about the prior conviction was made, and the
conviction was admitted pursuant to rule 609(a)(1).
2

If circumstances additional to these are relevant, the
trial court should also factor them into the balance. State v.
Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 857 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d
897 (Utah 1993).
8

argued

that

defendant's

prior

convictions

should

inadmissible under the habitual criminal statute.
rejected this argument.3

all

be

The court

It observed that defendant's prior

convictions should be analyzed "to determine whether the probative
value outweighs the -- the prejudicial effect of
conviction[s] " (R. 118).

the

The court then enumerated the Banner

factors and concluded that defendant's prior convictions for
possession of a stolen vehicle and larceny ought to be excluded
because they were too similar to the charge at issue, theft of an
operable motor vehicle

(R. 119).

The court then asked for

arguments on the remaining conviction of burglary.

While both

sides offered statements, neither party analyzed the facts of the
case under the relevant balancing test.4
3

Defendant's argument keys in on the following language in
the statute governing procedure and punishment of habitual
criminals: "If a jury is impaneled, it shall not be told of the
previous felony convictions or charge of being a habitual
criminal." The next sentence, however, states: "The trial on the
felony committed within the state of Utah shall proceed as in other
cases." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001(2). The plain import of this
language is that the information used to support the habitual
criminal charge is to be kept separate from the trial on the
underlying felony. Only if defendant is convicted of the felony at
issue will other past convictions come before the trier of fact for
purposes of making the habitual criminal determination. Plainly,
however, this statute does not preclude the use of a prior
conviction for impeachment purposes if the prior conviction meets
the standard for admissibility under rule 609. See R. 117-118 or
Addendum A
4

Defendant argues on appeal that the State failed to carry
its burden of demonstrating that the probative value of the prior
conviction for burglary outweighed its prejudicial effect (Br. of
App. at 11-13).
Defendant, however, made no objection to the
paucity of the analysis below, nor did defendant suggest that the
court should not itself engage in the required analysis because the
State failed to engage in it first. Under the circumstances, the
9

The trial court then proceeded methodically

through the

required Banner analysis. First, the court found that burglary was
not a crime of dishonesty or false statement warranting automatic
admission under rule 609(a)(2), but that:
the crime of burglary is one that indicates -it's on the -- it's on the range of those that
indicate a willingness to depart from the
standards of society. It's -- it's the kind
of crime that -- that involves oftentimes,
some sort of -- the use of subterfuge, it's
done at night or it's done when people are
unaware.
It's kind of a -- for lack of a
better word, kind of a sneaky crime.
(R. 121 or Addendum A ) .
statement

is that

The fair inference from the court's

it believed

burglary

to be probative

of

credibility to a degree less than a crime formally recognized as
one of dishonesty or false statement but more than a crime wholly
unrelated to falsity.

See, e.g., United States v. Lipscomb. 702

F.2d 1049 (D.C.Cir. 1983) ("Robbery is generally less probative [of
credibility] than crimes that involve deception or stealth. But it
does involve theft and is a serious crime that shows conscious
disregard for the rights of others.

Such conduct reflects more

strongly on credibility than, say, crimes of impulse, or simple
narcotics or weapons possession").
Second, the court found that the 1991 burglary conviction was
"about as recent as you could get with this defendant." (R. 121-22
or Addendum A) .

The recentness of the prior conviction plainly

mandates in favor of probativeness. Cf. State v. Gentry. 747 P.2d

issue has been waived.
App. 1993).

State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 359-60 (Utah
10

at 1037 (remoteness of ten year old rape conviction at time of
trial "is a measure of its negligible probative value"); accord
State v. Banner, 717 P.2d at 1335.
Third, the court found that burglary and theft of an operable
motor vehicle were not similar crimes, stating:

,f

[T]he jury's not

likely to look at [the prior burglary conviction] and say he's
committed a burglary before, so therefore, he must have committed
theft of an automobile. They're different types of crimes" (R. 122
or Addendum A ) .
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in its evaluation
of this factor (Br. of App. at 7-11) .

Defendant takes issue on

appeal with the court's reasoning only as to this factor, tacitly
conceding that the court properly analyzed the remaining four
factors.

In essence, defendant believes that not only should the

court have found this factor to be prejudicial, but that it was so
prejudicial as to outweigh the other correctly-determined factors
and tip the balance to exclusion.

Defendant asserts that the

admission was prejudicial because it would lead the jury to believe
that defendant, because he stole once, would do it again (Br. of
App. at 9). 5
Defendant, however, misperceives the crime of burglary, which
may or may not include an act of theft.

Utah's statute provides:

"A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully
5

Defendant's brief muddles the distinction between admission
of a prior conviction to impeach credibility and admission of a
prior conviction substantively to show propensity to act in a
certain way.
The former is plainly admissible under the
circumstances delineated in rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence.
11

in a building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a
felony or theft or commit an assault on any person."

Utah Code

Ann. § 76-6-202(1) (1990) (emphasis added) . In this case, there was
no evidence before the court that defendant's prior conviction for
burglary involved the element of theft. And, in any event, Banner
requires a balancing test. Its success or failure does not ride on
any single factor.

Instead, the court must weigh all five factors

to reach an equitable result.

State v. Banner. 717 P.2d at 1334.

The fourth and fifth factors, the importance of credibility in
a

case

lacking

in decisive

nontestimonial

evidence

and

the

importance of the accused's testimony, are usually considered in
tandem.

See State v. Banner, 717 P.2d at 1335; State v. Gentry,

747 P.2d at 1037. The trial court here found:

"It is important to

the prosecutor to . . . give the jury some sort of a basis for
weighing his testimony against the testimony . . .

of the other

witnesses and weighing his explanation as to how truthful that
really is.

And although this -- certainly his testimony is also

important to him, his explanation was already in through being
quoted by the officers" (R. 122 or Addendum A) .

Both of these

factors, in the court's view, weighed in favor of admitting the
prior conviction.

Defendant's credibility was plainly important

in assessing his intent. If the jury believed that he intended to
return the car, it probably would not have convicted him as
charged. The fourth factor, then, would lean towards admission of
the prior conviction insofar as it might shed light on defendant's
credibility.
12

Defendant's own, personal testimony, however, was not critical
to his defense because all three police officers who testified
agreed that defendant stated that he intended to return the vehicle
(R. 85, 95, 107).

The fifth factor, then, would not warrant

exclusion because defendant did not have to take the stand and
thereby

open

himself

to

cross

examination

about

his

prior

conviction. Presumably, the main impetus for his testimony was to
reveal evidence of his intent, and that evidence had already come
in through the three officers.
Having completed the appropriate analysis, the trial court
concluded

that

the probative

value

of

the prior

conviction

outweighed its possible prejudicial effect and admitted it (R. 122
or Addendum A).

In reviewing this determination, the trial court

must be accorded a measure of discretion and should only be
reversed if this Court concludes that the trial court acted
unreasonably in striking the balance.

State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d

at 781-82 n.3; State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1270, n.ll) . The most
that can be said in this case, however, is that reasonable minds
could differ on admissibility.

Under such circumstances, the

determination of the trial court should be upheld.
And, in any event, the admission of the prior conviction was
overshadowed by the substance of defendant's testimony, which shed
far more doubt on his credibility than his brief statement that he
had been convicted of burglary in 1991.

On cross-examination,

defendant testified at length about his intention to return the $19
he had taken from the vehicle to its owner.
13

He stated he had

"recently" opened a bank account in Moab and that he had been
planning to go to the bank the next day, withdraw a "$10 bill, five
and some ones," and then go by Shontee Torres's house and put the
money in her mailbox.

If she turned out not to have a mailbox, he

would "find some other way" to get the money back to her (R. 11216) .

This story, on its face, raises serious questions about

defendant's credibility. Its substance reflects the kind of common
sense good planning that is highly inconsistent with defendant's
admittedly impulsive behavior.

Furthermore, the story smacks of

after-the-fact rationalization, very similar to his stated intent
to return the car.

This testimony, reflecting so poorly on

defendant's credibility, renders the brief mention of a prior
conviction de minimis by comparison.
cannot

be

said

that

the

admission

Under the circumstances, it
of

the prior

conviction

prejudiced defendant's substantial rights.
Because the trial court conducted the proper legal analysis
and acted reasonably in determining that the prior conviction was
admissible, this Court should affirm that determination.
POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL
WHERE THE COURT IMMEDIATELY ADMONISHED THE
JURY
TO
DISREGARD
THE
STATEMENT
AND
SUBSEQUENTLY GAVE A CURATIVE JURY INSTRUCTION
Deputy Sheriff Brewer testified about his interview with
defendant at the Sheriff's Office following the arrest.

He

testified that defendant stated that he had taken a girlfriend to
Grand Junction to pick up some belongings and then had returned to
14

Moab.

The prosecution then asked, "Okay, what else?" (R. 94 or

Addendum B).

To this general query, the officer volunteered: "He

did advise me that he had just been paroled from the Utah State
Prison" (Id.). Defense counsel objected, and the court immediately
responded: "The jury will disregard any -- any of that" (Id.).
Out of the presence of the jury, defense counsel moved for a
mistrial

(R. 99 or Addendum C) .

The court denied the motion,

stating:
Well, the -- the testimony was clearly
inadmissible, at least at this point I'd have
to say that it was inadmissible. I can't see
any -- any way that the fact that he was on
parole would -- would be admissible in
evidence.
[The prosecutor] did not specifically ask
for that information.
It would have been
better if Deputy Brewer had -- had known not
to volunteer that, or been instructed by [the
prosecutor] not to volunteer that; but on the
other hand, [defense counsel] also would have
had an opportunity to — to know that that was
a possibility that that would come out and
file a motion.
I'm going to deny the motion for a
mistrial.
[Defense counsel], I will give
whatever curative instruction you may request
about that because it clearly should be
disregarded by the jury.
If you want to
request a curative instruction, I'll -- I will
give as emphatic an instruction as you would
1 ike, that it's something that' s - - that
shouldn't have anything to do with the jury's
decision in the case.
(R. 99-100 or Addendum C) .

Later in the discussion, the court

further observed:
"My impression is that that kinda -- that went
by kinda fast, and -- and I didn't want to
make a big deal out of sustaining the
objection. And so I didn't -- didn't do that,
just told the jury that they should — they
should disregard that. And my impression is,
15

it's not something that made much of a stir in
the courtroom, but I will give whatever
curative instruction you request . . . on that
subject."
R. 100-101 or Addendum C) . Defense counsel subsequently requested
a curative instruction, which the trial court gave (R. 160, 70). 6
On appeal, defense counsel asserts that the officer's single
statement,

in

conjunction

with

the

admission

of

the

prior

conviction, unfairly prejudiced the jury against him (Br. of App.
at 19-20).

However, the two alleged errors cannot be cumulated in

this manner.

Once defendant's prior felony conviction had been

admitted, the fact that defendant was on parole from prison added
nothing of significance to the total picture before the jury at the
time it reached its decision.

Surely, it would come as no surprise

to a jury that someone convicted of a felony had been sentenced to
prison.
In

any

event,

a

trial

court

"has

broad

discretion

in

determining whether a mistrial should be declared, and the denial
of

a motion

for

a mistrial

does not

constitute

an

discretion where no prejudice to the accused is shown."
Workman, 635 P.2d 49, 53

(Utah 1981) .

abuse

of

State v.

In this case, the court

observed that the officer's reference to parole was "not something

6

Jury instruction number 11 stated, in pertinent part:
Whether or not defendant was on parole at
the time he is accused of committing a crime
is not in evidence.
You should completely
disregard anything you may have heard in that
connection. It has no bearing on the guilt or
innocence of the defendant and has not met the
standards for admissibility in this court.

R. 70.
16

that made much of a stir in the courtroom" (R. 101) . See State v.
Williams, 773 P.2d 1368, 1373 (Utah 1989) (court affirms denial of
mistrial motion, observing as one factor that trial court had
noticed no visible reaction from jury when reference to parole
officer was made)•

In addition, the remark was very brief and was

made only in passing.

See State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 883

(Utah 1988) (court affirms denial of mistrial motion, citing as one
factor that "the witness's reference to the warrant was very brief
and was only made in passing").
Furthermore, the trial court obviated any error by immediately
admonishing the jury to disregard the statement and by giving the
requested curative instruction at the close of trial. See State v.
Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 70 (Utah 1993).

The volunteered statement by

the officer, while not beneficial

to defendant, was not so

prejudicial

as to create a reasonable

likelihood

favorable result for defendant in its absence.
771 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Utah 1989).

of a more

State v. Johnson,

Under the circumstances, the

trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's
motion for a mistrial.
POINT THREE
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE STATE WAS
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT OF
GUILTY
In conducting a review for sufficiency of the evidence, this
Court should not disturb the jury's verdict "so long as some
evidence and reasonable inferences11 support the jury's decision.
State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App. 1990).
17

In

this

case,

Defendant

argues

that

the

evidence

was

insufficient to support the intent element of the offense for which
he was convicted.

Theft of an operable motor vehicle requires

unauthorized control over the property of another "with a purpose
to

deprive

"Purpose

to

him

[sic]

deprive"

thereof."
is

Utah

statutorily

Code

Ann.

defined

as

§ 76-6-404.
a

conscious

objective:
(a) To withhold property permanently or for
so extended a period or to use under such
circumstances that a substantial portion of
its economic value, or the use and benefit
thereof, would be lost; or
(b) To restore the property only upon
payment of a reward or other compensation; or
(c) To dispose of the property under
circumstances that make it unlikely that the
owner will recover it.
Utah

Code

Ann.

§

76-6-401(3)

(1990).

Because

defendant

consistently maintained that his intent was to return the vehicle
to Moab City Park and because defendant returned to Moab after
taking the vehicle, he believes the State has failed to adduce
sufficient evidence of intent to support the conviction.
Defendant has failed, however, to consider the inferences that
may properly be drawn from the testimony adduced at trial. While
the jury could have believed defendant's testimony that he intended
to return the vehicle, it also could have reasonably inferred that
defendant's stated intent was fabricated as a convenient way out of
a

sticky situation.

Bolstering this inference

is defendant's

improbable testimony that he intended to return the money he took
from Shontee's vehicle by withdrawing it from his bank account and
placing it in her mailbox the next day.
18

Both statements smack of

after-the-fact rationalization.

A reasonable inference from the

facts adduced at trial is that defendant intended to keep the car,
but was simply caught short by prompt police action.

See, e.g. ,

State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d at 1072-73 (defendant's intent to commit
theft could be inferred from circumstances, including his unlikely
explanation for his presence in a stranger's home).
Similarly,

while

defendant's

return

to

Moab

could

be

interpreted as evidence of his intent to return the vehicle, it
could

also

simply be the act of

an individual who behaves

impulsively and does not think of the consequences of his acts.
Indeed, defendant freely admitted that he took the car "on impulse"
(R. 108) . His unthinking behavior in that instance is consistent
with his later acts of audibly moving around the back of the
trailer and then assuming that lying quietly under the bed would
hide him, even if his foot was sticking out.
It is, of course, the jury's prerogative both to assess the
credibility of the witnesses and to weigh their testimony.

State

v. Martinez, 709 P.2d 355, 356 (Utah 1985) . This court does not
"sit

as

a

second

fact

credibility of witnesses."
(Utah 1994).

finder"

nor

does

it

"determine

the

State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543

Certainly, if the jury had believed defendant's

version of events and disbelieved all the other witnesses, it could
have acquitted him. But the jury chose not to do so, and defendant
has not shown how the evidence and inferences that may properly be
drawn from it are so "inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
19

defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." State v.
Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).

Under such circumstances,

this Court should not disturb the jury's decision. State v. Moore.
802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App. 1990).

Accord State v. Booker, 709

P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ZO

day of September, 1994.
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Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A
Discussion of Prior Conviction Admissibility

1

A

No.

2

Q

Okay.

3

A

Well, I would have had to find out some other way.

4

Q

Mr. Gauger,

5

I don't.
What would you have done if she didn't?

have you

convicted

of a

felony?

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

What felony and when?

8 I
9

ever been

I have.

MS. STARLEY:

Your Honor, if we could have a brief

recess to discuss this.

I believe there's an issue.

10

THE COURT:

Members of the jury, an issue's arisen

11

which requires that

I make a determination as to whether

12

evidence is admissible or not, and I'm going to excuse you so

13

that I can make that ruling and--outside of your presence.

14

So, I'll go ahead and ask you to leave the courtroom and have

15

the bailiff come and get you when it's time for you to come

16

back into the courtroom.

17

Oh,

that's

right.

case,

jury,

20

issue until it's finally submitted to you; but you can get a

21

drink of water if you'd like.
Honor,

allow

the

discuss it in your presence, don't make up your mind to any

Your

don't

of

19

STARLEY:

the

members

remember,

MS.

discuss

And

18

22

don't

I hope it won't take too much time.

under

the

anyone

to

habitual

23

criminal code section, 78-8-101, it states that any crime that

24 I

is, or conviction that is relied upon to charge the defendant

25

with habitual criminal cannot be brought up to the jury.
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1

And I believe from my review of his criminal history

2

that all his felony convictions would have--would come under

3

that.

4

Information as the ones that the State is relying upon.

I believe

5

all

MR. BENGE:

of

them

have

been

listed

on

the

Your Honor, I tend to agree with the

6

fact that I couldn't bring it up to the jury without--without

7

his denying it; however, I still believe--I don't think that

8

obviates my ability to ask him, for credibility purposes,

9

whether he's been convicted of a felony and what felony and

10

when.

11

THE COURT:

12

meaning

13

underlying

14

charged, that--that the jury will not receive information as

15

to the prior convictions with regard to the habitual criminal

16

charge, so that--so there's no cross-contamination there.

17

nothing

Well, I interpret that provision as--as

more

charge,

than

where

that

during

habitual

the

trial

criminal

on

is--is

the
also

I don't interpret that as--as meaning that the rules

18

that

19

convictions to impeach a witness would--would be abrogated, so

20

I think those--those rules are--the application of Rule 609 or

21

Rule 404(b) are not affected, not intended to'be affected by

22

that statute, and a reasonable reading of it, they would not

23

be a f f e c t e d .

24
25

would

ordinarily

apply

for

introduction

of

felony

So, t h e y ' r e c e r t a i n l y not a d m i s s i b l e t o show that
he's

a habitual

criminal

at

this

stage;
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1

admissible

for purposes of credibility when he takes the

2

stand, they'd be admissible on the same basis as in any other

3

case, where--if they were admissible to show anything else

4

under Rule 404(b).

5

So, let's move on to that next question then, Mr.

6

Benge. Are you introducing them for any purpose under Rule 4-

7
8|

MR. BENGE:

For impeachment purposes, your Honor.

9

THE COURT:

Under Rule 609, then?

10

MR. BENGE:

Yes, sir.

11

THE COURT:

All right.

And under Rule 609, I'm

12

supposed to determine whether the probative value outweighs

13

the--the prejudicial effect of this--this testimony, or of the

14

conviction,

15

consider five factors.

16

veracity of the witness and to what extent, and I'm assuming

17

there that I'm supposed to evaluate all of those felonies that

18

are

19

testimonial

20

automatically come in anyway, so I'm supposed to evaluate

21

these particular convictions to find out whether those kinds

22

of crimes, how much they bear on veracity.

23

would be a range, intoxication, well, of course, it's not a

24

felony.

25

not--do

and

under

not

State

They are:

involve

dishonesty

vs. Banner,

or

supposed

to

does the crime bear on the

dishonesty
false

I'm

or

false

statement,

statement,

'cause

those

I suppose there

Anyway, I need to--I would need to evaluate that.
The recentness or the remoteness is something I'm
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1

supposed to consider.

2

'cause it bears on the prejudice, the--the rule of thumb is

3

that there would be a rare, rare case when a crime similar to

4

what's being charged would be admissible, because it would--in

5

the jury's mind, it would tend to overshadow everything else.

6 1

The similarity to the charged crime,

So, I'm probably going to--with that presumption,

7

I'm probably going to leave out anything that involves this

8

same kind of offense. So, possession of a stolen vehicle is —

9

is out.

10

Probably ought--larceny ought to be out as veil, or

probably will be out as well.

11

So, the only one we're left with is this burglary

12

conviction on January 4th, 1991.

13

evaluate the importance to the prosecution, is their decisive

14

non--non-testimonial evidence that would allow the jury to

15

evaluate this testimony, and which is kind of the reverse of

16

the same coin; how important is the accused testimony.

X7

And then I'm supposed to

And those appear to be the--two sides of the same

18

coin.

If

it's

19

important

80

getting at there is it may be a situation where it is not that

21

important that the defendant be permitted to testify and--or

22

that he be permitted to testify without his credibility being

23

attacked with felony convictions.

to

important

the defense,

to

the

although

prosecution,

it's

I think what

also

they're

24

For example, there may be a case where his defense

25

is apparent from all the other evidence that's been submitted
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1

and—and when he takes the stand, he's just trying to get a

2

little extra advantage, and if he's doing that, and it's not

3

essential to take the stand in order to present his defense,

4

then that should be considered in--in weighing the prejudice

5

versus the probative value.

6

So, with that being a factor, let's hear with regard

7

to the burglary conviction in 1991, what your arguments are

S

about prejudice versus probative value.

Mr- Benge?

9

MR. BENGE: Your Honor, I just think that it--it--it

10

just goes to the issue of his credibility, and the prejudicial

11

factor, I--I can't say.

12

to argue, but it certainly, to me, if I were sitting on a

13

jury,

14

innocent or if he--if he had some reason to be fabricating

15

this story.

I would want

I guess I'd leave that up to Sandra

to know

16

THE COURT:

17

MS. STARLEY:

if this person were

a sweet

Ms. Starley?
I think for that same reason is why

18

it's prejudicial to the defendant.

19

he has been convicted of a felony will impact them and make

20

them

2i

credibility is a central issue; although there is testimony

22

already in as to him testifying at--or telling the officers at

23

the time what he intended to do with the vehicle.

weigh

his

credibility

To have the jury know that

differently,

and

I think

his

24

His credibility, though, is a very important issue,

25

and I think that will be compromised by admitting the felony
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Q

1
2
3
4

conviction.
MR. BENGE:

I agree it would be compromised and

that's the exact reason we're trying to get it in.
THE COURT:

Right.

And the idea is, the law says#

5

we don't want the jury to say he's done it# he's committed a

6

felony before; therefore, he must be guilty of any crime.

7

MS. STARLEY:

8

THE COURT:

That's my biggest concern.
And on the other hand, if he has done

9

something in the past that indicates a willingness to depart

10

from the standards of society, that may also mean that he's

11

willing to depart from the standards of society by not telling

12

the truth when he's on the witness stand.

13

And so as I evaluate these five factors, I find that

14

this is the kind of crime--it is not a crime of testimonial

15

dishonesty or a false statement.

16

under Rule

17

automatically, the crime of burglary is one that indicates--

18

it's on the--it's on the range of those that

19

willingness to depart from the standards of society.

20

it's the kind of crime that—that involves oftentimes, some

21

sort of--the use of subterfuge, it's done at night or it's

22

done when people are unaware.

23

better word, kind of a sneaky crime.

That comes in no matter what

609; but among the crimes that

don't

come in

indicate a
It's--

It's kind of a--for lack of a

24

It--this conviction is recent or remote--or it--this

25

is not remote, it's recent, it's about as recent as you could
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1

get with this defendant.

2

It is not similar to the charged crime.

They're--

3

the jury's not likely to look at it and say he's committed a

4

burglary before, so therefore, he must have committed theft of

5

an automobile. They're different kinds of crimes.

6

It is important to the prosecutor to--to have the

7

jury--give the jury some sort of a basis for weighing his

6

testimony

9

witnesses and weighing his explanation as to how truthful that

10

really is. And although this--certainly his testimony is also

11

important to him, his explanation was already in through being

12

quoted by the officers.

13

So,

against

the

the

testimony

Court

finds

of

other--of

that--that

the

the--even

other

with

14

recognizing that the burden is on the prosecution, that the

15

prior conviction for burglary, a third-degree felony, in--on

16

January 4th, 1991, in Third District Court, the probative

17

value does outweigh the prejudicial value, and that will be

18

admitted; but the--the other two, the record of the other two

19

felonies will not be admitted.

20
21

Mr. Bailiff, you can escort the jury back into the
courtroom.

22

So, just answer about that.

23

THE WITNESS:

24

THE COURT:

25

Okay.
Is the only one you have to answer

about.
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ADDENDUM B
Parole Comment and Objection

1

A

Mr. Gauger waived his rights, I had some questions

2

that I wanted to ask Mr. Gauger, which I did.

I asked Mr.

3

Gauger if he'd stolen the vehicle. Basically, I asked him if

4

he would just go through the story of when he took the

5

vehicle.

6

residence, he had gotten loaded.

7

Wickem residence to the Hillyard, which is northeast of the

B

residence that he'd left.

He advised me that he had been at the Wickem
He was--he walked from the

9

He passed by this--this car in question, the Camaro,

10

he observed the keys in the ignition. He walked around to the

11

passenger side, got in the vehicle and drove off.

He told--

12

Q

Did he say where he went?

13

A

He told me that he picked up his girlfriend, Shilo

14

Walker, took her to Grand Junction to pick up some of her

15

belongings, that he was moving her back to Moab. And which he

16

stated he did drive to Grand Junction and then brought her

17

back.

18

Q

Okay.

What else?

19

A

He did advise me that he had just been paroled from

20

the Utah State Prison.

2i

MS. STARLEY:

22

THE COURT: Sustained. The jury will disregard any-

23

Objection, your Honor.

-any of that.

24

Q

(By Mr. Benge)

Did he make any other statements?

25

A

Can I look at my notes?
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ADDENDUM C
Ruling on Motion for Mistrial

1

afternoon, coordinate your watches to the clock on the wall

2

there, if you have any doubt about what time it is.

3

Are there any matters that we need to address?

4

MS. STARLEY:

5

THE COURT:

Yes.
All right.

We'll go ahead and excuse

6

the jury at this time.

7

things we need to talk about that you don't have to concern

6

yourselves with.

9
10
11
12

(Whereupon,

Come back at 1:30.

the

jury

was

We have a few

excused

from

the

courtroom.)
THE COURT: The record will show that the Court's in
session outside of the hearing of the jury.

13

Ms. Starley?

14

MS. STARLEY:

Yes.

I would be moving--moving for a

15

mistrial on the basis of Mr. Brewer's comment that Mr. Gauger

16

had just been paroled from the State Prison.

17

MR. BENGE:

Your Honor, I'd, of course, strenuously

IB

object to that.

19

elements, or the items told to him by Mr. Gauger. Ms. Starley

20

was privy to his report from the outset in this matter.

21

she wanted him to be cautioned by me not to go" into that, or

22

cautioned by the Court not to go into that, she's certainly

23

had ample opportunity to make a motion in limine.

24
25

Mr. Brewer was just reciting in toto the

THE COURT:

If

Well, the--the testimony was clearly

inadmissible, at least at this point I'd have to say that it
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1

was inadmissible.

2

he was on parole would--would be admissible in evidence.

3

Mr.

I can't see any—any way that the fact that

Benge

did

not

specifically

ask

for

that

4

information.

5

had known not to volunteer that, or been instructed by Mr.

6

Benge not

7

Starley also would have had an opportunity to--to know that

8

that was a possibility that that would come out and file a

9

motion.

10

It would have been better if Deputy Brewer had--

to volunteer that; but on the other hand, Ms.

I'm going to deny the motion for a mistrial.

Ms.

11

Starley, I will give whatever curative instruction you may

12

request about that because it clearly should be disregarded by

13

the jury.

14

I'11--I will give as emphatic an instruction as you would

15

like, that it's something that's—that shouldn't have anything

16

to do with the jury's decision in the case.

17
IS

If you want to request a curative instruction,

MS. STARLEY:

Can I reserve that issue until the

instruction time?

19

THE COURT:

Yes.

20

MS. STARLEY:

And I'll make that decision as to

2i

whether--we always have the problem with emphasizing it by

22

doing a curative.

23

THE COURT:

Whether you should bring--whether you

24

should bring it up again.

My impression is that that kinda--

25

that went by kinda fast, and--and I didn't want to make a big
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101

10Q

1

deal out of sustaining the objection. And so I didn't--didn't

2

do that, just told the jury that they should--they should

3

disregard that. And my impression is, it's not something that

4

made much of a stir in the courtroom, but I will give whatever

5

curative

6

subject.

instruction

you

request,

Ms.

Starley,

on

that

7

Court will be in recess until 1:30 this afternoon.

6

(Recess.)

9

THE COURT:

All right.

Members of the jury, have

10

you done any of those things I told you not to do?

11

supposed to ask.

12

ask you to make sure you didn't.

13

tried to do any of those things with you?

14

happens, you report it to the bailiff, and I'll have him--or

15

report it to the clerk and I'll address that with you.

16
17

I'm

I'm supposed to remind you every time and
All right.

Or has anyone
If any of that

All right.

Mr. Benge, I think we were still with

MR. BENGE:

Officer Craig Bowen.

you.

18
19

CRAIG BOWEN,

20

called as a witness by and on behalf of the State in this

21

matter, after having been first duly sworn, was examined and

22

testified as follows:

23
24

25

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BENGE:

Q

S t a t e your name f o r the Court, p l e a s e .
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